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Abstract—Introduction & Objectives: Norwich’s Entropy 
Theory of Perception (1975 [1] -present) stands alone. It explains 
many firing-rate behaviors and psychophysical laws from bare 
theory. To do so, it demands a unique sort of interaction between 
receptor and brain, one that Norwich never substantiated. Can it 
now be confirmed, given the accumulation of empirical sensory 
neuroscience? Background: Norwich conjoined sensation and a 
mathematical model of communication, Shannon’s Information 
Theory, as follows: “In the entropic view of sensation, magnitude 
of sensation is regarded as a measure of the entropy or 
uncertainty of the stimulus signal” [2]. “To be uncertain about 
the outcome of an event, one must first be aware of a set of 
alternative outcomes” [3]. “The entropy-establishing process 
begins with the generation of a [internal] sensory signal by the 
stimulus generator. This is followed by receipt of the [external] 
stimulus by the sensory receptor, transmission of action 
potentials by the sensory neurons, and finally recapture of the 
[response to the internal] signal by the generator” [4]. The latter 
“recapture” differentiates external from internal stimuli. The 
hypothetical “stimulus generators” are internal emitters, that 
generate photons in vision, audible sounds in audition (to 
Norwich, the spontaneous otoacoustic emissions [SOAEs]), 
“temperatures in excess of local skin temperature” in skin 
temperature sensation [4], etc. Method (1): Several decades of 
empirical sensory physiology literature was scrutinized for 
internal “stimulus generators”. Results (1): Spontaneous 
photopigment isomerization (“dark light”) does not involve 
visible light. SOAEs are electromechanical basilar-membrane 
artefacts that rarely produce audible tones. The skin’s 
temperature sensors do not raise skin temperature, etc. Method 
(2): The putative action of the brain-and-sensory-receptor loop 
was carefully reexamined. Results (2): The sensory receptor 
allegedly “perceives”, experiences “awareness”, possesses 
“memory”, and has a “mind”. But those traits describe the whole 
human. The receptor, thus anthropomorphized, must therefore 
contain its own perceptual loop, containing a receptor, containing 
a perceptual loop, etc. Summary & Conclusions: The Entropy 
Theory demands sensory awareness of alternatives, through an 
imagined brain-and-sensory-receptor loop containing internal 
“stimulus generators”. But (1) no internal “stimulus generators” 
seem to exist and (2) the loop would be the outermost of an 
infinite nesting of identical loops. 
Keywords—cybernetics, information theory, loop, receptor, 
uncertainty 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Entropy Theory of Perception of K.H. Norwich and 
co-authors is a mathematical opus that, at last count, was 
spread over no fewer than 20 peer-reviewed papers, a book, 
and at least 20 abstracts. The theory had a preternatural 
flexibility, explaining many firing-rate behaviors and 
psychophysical laws, all purely from algebra. To do so, it 
demanded a unique sort of interaction between the sensory 
receptor and the brain. The explanation of that interaction was 
spread over two papers and a conference proceeding [3]-[5]. 
Norwich and his later co-authors never provided data to 
substantiate the hypothesized interaction. However, it may 
now be extensively checked thanks to a great accumulation of 
neuroscience data in the intervening years. 
II. NORWICH ET AL.=S ENTROPY THEORY OF PERCEPTION 
The Entropy Theory will first be synopsized for the 
unfamiliar reader. As noted, the theory was spread among 
many papers. The crux of the theory is that we perceive only 
when uncertain, and that perception ends when certainty is 
reached [6]-[8]. Shannon=s Information Theory states that 
reduction of uncertainty equals gain of information [9], and as 
such, it is there that the Entropy Theory seeks an explanation 
for psychophysical phenomena [10]-[13]. Shannon stated that 
uncertainty is caused by an event having n possible outcomes. 
Knowing those outcomes, and their probabilities of occurrence 
{p1 , ... , pn}, allows the calculation of some useful quantities, 
as follows. Shannon stated that the information associated with 
probability pi is –log (pi). Still following Shannon, the average 
information derived from observing the outcome of the event, 
the information that Norwich et al. called the Astimulus 
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[11], [14]. When logarithms are in base 2, the information is in 
binary information units, or “bits”. In base e (=2.71828...), 
information is in “natural units”. Maximising IS [15, p56] 
leads to equal probabilities {p1 = p2 = ... = pn}. Thus, for 
example, the information transmitted when a person familiar 
with dice observes the roll of a single, fair, six-sided die will 
be -6 (1/6 log 1/6) = log 6, the actual number depending on the 
chosen base of the logarithm. With only one outcome, 
conversely, IS  =  !1 log1 = 0. That is, we already knew the 
outcome of the event, so no new information was available. In 
the Entropy Theory, an outcome that is certain is not 
perceivable [3], [10}, [11], [16]-[18]; after [9]. 
III. THE ROLE OF THE SENSORY RECEPTOR 
According to Norwich et al. (but note that Shannon offered 
no view on this), information is transmitted to the sensory 
receptor (not by the receptor) when a stimulus is applied [19]. 
As Norwich notes, “The sensory receptor forms part of a 
channel, and the afferent neuron part of a metachannel ... The 
metachannel transmits in coded form the degree of uncertainty 
residing at the receptor about some quality of the stimulus” [4, 
p175] (also [3]). For example, in vision, the stream of photons 
approaching the eye is the channel [3]. Thus, the sensory 
afferent does not transmit information about the stimulus 
attribute (say, intensity), but about the uncertainty removed at 
the receptor upon exposure to the stimulus [20], [21]. “In the 
entropic view of sensation, magnitude of sensation is regarded 
as a measure of the entropy or uncertainty of the stimulus 
signal” [2, p806]. For a steady light, the activity of the optic 
nerve relays the rate at which the eye is becoming more certain 
about the light [17]. 
The receptor organ=s degree of uncertainty is represented 
by the entropy, which Norwich et al. called ES or H (e.g. [11]). 
The entropy was calculated after Shannon as follows. Imagine 
a communications system that is transmitting and receiving 
symbols. Let p j (k) be the probability of transmission of 
symbol k, given that symbol j has been received (see [22]). 
Then 
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The neuronal or psychophysical response, both called F [6], 
[10], [11], [19], [20], [23] is proportional to ES. Information 
transmitted It is given by 
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The origins of the latter equation for psychophysical use are 
explained in [24]. 
IV. RECEPTOR TO BRAIN: THE PERCEPTUAL LOOP 
A. The Need for Foreknowledge 
Norwich [3, p835] noted that “To be uncertain about the 
outcome of an event, one must first be aware of a set of 
alternative outcomes”. That is, one must have foreknowledge. 
For example, to have foreknowledge of intensity, “the receptor 
must previously have perceived a number of stimulus 
intensities, so that it may now ‘doubt’ which of the possible 
intensities, is present” [3, p835]. But how does the sensory 
receptor know a priori the potential intensities of a stimulus? 
According to Norwich ([4, p179], [5, p537]; see also [11], on 
taste), “one could postulate that nature endows the receptor 
with innate uncertainty, which will re-appear spontaneously 
after the act of perception, and in this way obviate the need for 
an active component to perception”. Norwich dismisses this 
idea as “unsatisfying” [5, p537] and “less convincing” [4, 
p179] than the approach to now be reviewed. 
B. Establishment of Uncertainty at the Receptor by the 
Action of the Perceptual Loop 
In the Entropy Theory, each sensory receptor forms part of 
a perceptual loop containing stimulus-generating powers, to 
provide self-calibration into a state of uncertainty and hence 
perceptual readiness [5]. To explain: according to the Entropy 
Theory, reduction of uncertainty (entropy) is a passive 
process, whereas creating uncertainty in the first place, before 
the presentation of any stimulus, is an active process [5]. 
Norwich provided the example that when flipping a coin, prior 
examination of the coin (an active process) establishes the two 
possibilities (heads or tails) that give the observer=s 
uncertainty, log2(2) bits. This uncertainty initialises the 
receptor [4]; all entropy reduction involves this 
“motor-sensory conjunction”. For a mechanoreceptor, 
self-calibration might occur by actual limb movement [14]. 
For a stretch receptor, the realm of weights that can be held is 
established by lifting different weights [4]. Generally, “you 
cycle any device through its range of outputs” [3, p835] and 
the receptor itself must remember these possibilities [3]. 
C. The Need for “Internal Transmitters” 
According to the Entropy Theory, the passive component 
of the perceptual unit must acknowledge the active 
component. For example, the act of examining a coin (active) 
must cause neuronal activity (passive) and so must the lifting 
of different known weights [4]. The perceiving of the force of 
a lifted weight must involve a “muscular component which is 
capable of actively generating a force” [5, p538]. Vision must 
involve the internal generation of photons [5] of at least two 
intensities of light [4] by a photoemitter [3]; the photons are 
then sensed by the [passive] visual receptor [3]-[5]. Similarly, 
the sensor for “temperature in excess of skin temperature, 
must be capable of generating temperatures in excess of local 
skin temperature” ([4, p180]; see also [3], [5]). No mention 
was made of sensors for temperatures less than skin 
temperature, which, by implication, would generate 
temperatures lesser than local skin temperature. 
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Fig. 1. The behavior of the perceptual loop in the Entropy Theory. The brain controls an internal transmitter from which internally generated 
stimuli, here imagined as longitudinal sound pressure waves, impinge upon the receptor. External stimuli (here, the sound pressure waves) 
also impinge upon the receptor. From there, neural spikes travel to the brain. The brain sends back to the internal transmitter, for 
acknowledgment, the spikes evoked at the receptor by the internally generated stimuli. Norwich did not explain how the brain distinguishes 
spikes evoked by internal stimuli from spikes evoked by external stimuli. 
 
For hearing, there “will be observed to be a generator of 
audible sound” [3, p836] (also [4], [5]), which may explain the 
ear’s known emission of narrowband acoustic signals [4], [5], 
the spontaneous otoacoustic emissions (SOAEs; e.g. [25]).  
Norwich [5] states that the latter define the auditory continuum 
that can be perceived, and that they play a role in the auditory 
perceptual loop (see also [4]). 
D. Why a Loop? 
In the Entropy Theory’s model of perceptual 
foreknowledge, the generation of self-calibration signals of 
differing intensities by internal transmitters is hypothetically 
controlled by the brain, as follows. The receptor hypothetically 
collects both internal and external signals [3]-[5]. (Norwich 
uses “signal” and “stimulus” interchangeably.) Norwich states 
that “The entropy-establishing process begins with the 
generation of a [internal] sensory signal [i.e. stimulus] by the 
stimulus generator. This is followed by receipt of the 
[external] stimulus by the sensory receptor, transmission of 
action potentials by the sensory neurons, and finally recapture 
of the [response to the internal] signal by the generator” [4, 
p187; bracketed terms supplied]. Hence “The capture of a 
signal [the receptor=s response to the internally-emitted signal] 
by the generator after an appropriate interval of time identifies 
the [same] signal, to a degree of probability, with the 
[internally-emitted] signal originally generated” [4, p187; 
bracketed terms supplied]. That is, “Reverberation or echoing 
of the generated signal provides the evidence that the system is 
closed” [4, p184], i.e. that the signal was self-generated and 
therefore a calibration signal rather than an outside stimulus. 
The external signal does not echo [4]. 
Fig. 1 shows the perceptual loop. 
V. A FLAW IN THE PROPOSED PERCEPTUAL LOOP 
There has been a vast accumulation of sensory research 
over the years since [3], which was the last of the three papers 
in which Norwich introduced the brain-receptor loop. The 
aforementioned mass of accumulated findings allows us to 
look for one crucial component of Norwich=s “perceptual 
loop”, namely, the “internal transmitters”, the Entropy 
Theory’s so-called sensory self-calibration mechanisms. It 
transpires that Norwich’s putative candidates for the role do 
not do what he claimed. First, the ear’s spontaneous 
otoacoustic emissions are one of a class of related emissions 
[26] which are artefacts of inner-ear mechanics, artefacts 
found in many but perhaps not all persons (see for example 
[27] and later reviews). These artefacts are not usually audible 
to the producer, although Norwich did not claim that they had 
to be. These emissions occur over only a restricted portion of 
the perceived range of frequencies, may be associated with 
auditory damage [27], and disappear after ingestion of aspirin 
[28], hardly the characteristics of a crucial mechanism. In 
vision, spontaneous isomerization of pigment molecules, 
so-called “dark light”, does not involve the generation of 
visible light (e.g. [29]). The many years of work on cutaneous 
pressure and temperature receptors have not yet revealed 
warmth receptors that “must be capable of generating 
temperatures in excess of local skin temperature” [4, p180] or 
any self-generation of touch sensations, except perhaps in 
pathological cases.  
 










Fig. 2. The nesting of an infinity of perceptual loops, as necessitated by the anthropomorphization of the 
receptor in the Entropy Theory (see text). IT =  internal transmitter; R = receptor. 
 
The suggested self-generation of forces by muscle stretch 
receptors [5], or of odours or tastes, has not been found except 
in pathological cases. 
Some possible reasons for the lack of Norwich’s proposed 
“internal emitters” are pursued in the next section. 
VI. DISCUSSION: THE ANTHROPOMORPHIZATION OF THE 
RECEPTOR 
Norwich [4, p186] stated that “It is taken as unconvincing 
that nature impregnates a receptor with innate uncertainty so 
that the receptor ‘awakens’ in doubt”. Having dismissed 
outright the idea that “a receptor is in some way, designed 
structurally to gravitate towards the interrogative” [5, p537], 
Norwich continues “How, then, did the receptor become 
‘aware’ of the existence of the array of potential stimulus 
magnitudes?” [5, p537]. His answer was the perceptual loop, 
including the receptor. To the latter, Norwich assigned 
“awareness” [5], [10], [17]. Regarding vision, Norwich 
suggested that “Suppose that we anthropomorphize the eye, 
bestow it with a memory and the ability to communicate its 
“thoughts”, and ask it to discuss with us its impressions in the 
milliseconds following the appearance of the light...” [17, 
p157]. The chemosensory receptor was later also 
anthropomorphized, in a similar manner (see [10], p155). 
Regarding the “initial uncertainty”, i.e. the earliest value of ES 
(see Eq. (2)) available to the receptor, Norwich states that “It 
seems to imply that the receptor was, in some way, ‘aware of’ 
or advised of the potential existence of stimuli which range 
over a whole continuum of magnitudes” [5, p537]. Norwich 
further states that “Clearly, it seems, the receptor has 
perceived all members of this array of stimuli in the past, and 
so retains some memory of the events” [5, p537]. 
Let us summarize the characteristics of the receptor 
according to the Entropy Theory. The receptor itself 
“perceives” (or “observes”; [30, p350], a behavior usually 
attributed to the whole organism. Further, the receptor has a 
“memory”. Norwich [3, p836] noted that “Memory of the set 
of possible signals engenders doubt or uncertainty in the 
‘mind’ of the receptor when confronted by an unknown 
signal”. Thus, the receptor had a “mind”, and could be 
“confronted”. In the same paper, the word “mind” was used 
differently, to describe the perceptual loop itself: “a unit 
capable of doubting, or being uncertain ... in principle, a 
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rudimentary ‘mind’ ” ([3, p835]; also [14]).1 But a mind is 
undisputably a characteristic of the whole human, not a portion 
thereof.  
If the receptor (or the perceptual loop) is indeed a mind or 
part of a mind, it must perforce contain its own perceptual loop 
- which must, by necessity, contain a receptor. That receptor 
(or the perceptual loop in which it is embedded) must contain 
its own perceptual loop, and so on ad infinitum. Such an 
infinity is not physically viable. First, it appears to  need an 
infinite amount of energy. Even if the successively nested 
levels of receptors used successively lower amounts of energy, 
the total amount of energy required might still not sum to a 
finite value. Even if it did, there is no reason to believe that the 
amount of time needed by each nested receptor would differ. 
Thus the amount of time required to perceive any given 
stimulus would be infinite. 
Fig. 2 shows the nesting of perceptual loops. 
The empirical lack of internal emitters can be understood if 
we ask how the brain distinguishes spikes evoked by internal 
stimuli from spikes evoked by external stimuli. Norwich and 
co-authors never answered that question. Regardless, the 
sensory gamut appears in a continuous flow, except in the 
most highly contrived laboratory conditions. But Norwich and 
co-authors conceived of perception as an “act”, perhaps a 
purposeful one, having a “before”, a “during”, and an “after”. 
That division is presumably what led Norwich to state that the 
internal signal is generated by the internal emitter “before” the 
external [stimulus] signal arrives at the receptor. This division 
of the stimulus gamut into “events” was necessary in order to 
apply information theory. Such a concept might be attractive 
to some, if, say, all stimulation occurred in discrete packets 
long enough for the receptor to reduce its uncertainty, 
followed by time gaps long enough for uncertainty to be re-
established. But the Entropy Theory gives no hint as to how 
that would be done. 
In real life, stimuli tend to occur in a quasi-continuous 
stream having changeable characteristics. This begs the 
question of what exactly is to be considered “the stimulus”, 
and when exactly are “before” and “after”. Faced with 
uncertainty about the what and the when of the stimulus 
stream, the emission of calibration stimuli by the internal 
emitters would have to be continuous, producing a ruinous 
drain of energy.  
VII. CONCLUSIONS: THE PERCEPTUAL LOOP STEMS FROM A 
NEEDLESS PARADOX 
The literature shows that the self-calibration mechanisms 
called for in the Entropy Theory are unlikely to exist. Further, 
the “perceptual loop” that allegedly uses those mechanisms is 
unphysical. In the Entropy Theory the receptor requires 
foreknowledge, a situation forced by the philosophical basis of 
the Entropy Theory: “Perception only if uncertainty, but 
uncertainty only if perception” [5, p538; also p537], a 
statement which Norwich himself admits is a paradox [e.g. 3, 
p835]. That paradox seems needless, and has not been used by 
                                                           
1 The amused reader may note that in one paper Norwich referred to 
both the “mind’s eye” and the “eye’s mind” [17]. 
other investigators. Indeed, the need for foreknowledge led to 
confusing complications. For example, it is unclear why 
Norwich mentions the conscious holding of different weights 
as a way that the receptor learns and remembers the range of 
available weights [4], after having already invoked the need 
[5] for a “muscular component which is capable of actively 
generating a force” in order to achieve the same goal. In any 
case, receptors do not learn and do not have memories; 
learning and memory are universally accepted as central 
processes. There is an obvious alternative approach: to 
postulate that perception has nothing at all to do with reduction 
of Shannon entropy (uncertainty), the core of the Entropy 
Theory, and to consider other general sensory models, of 
which there are plenty. 
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